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The Special Forces warrant officer is vital to the health of the Special Forces Regiment. 
The warrant officer’s institutional knowledge—developed over years of operational 
experience—is essential to the success of Special Operations Forces’ global endeavors. 
The Special Forces Regiment harnesses its future institutional capability through the 
recruitment and retention of Special Forces warrant officers. For the past five years, the 
Special Forces Regiment has seen a decrease in its warrant officer recruitment and 
retention rates. If left unattended, these rates will likely continue to decline. 
This thesis offers insights into the factors affecting the recruitment and retention 
of Special Forces warrant officers. By looking at recruitment and retention policies and 
assessing expert opinion in the Regiment, this thesis attempts to determine the 
recruitment and retention modifications that may reverse the declining trend. In doing so, 
this thesis identifies multiple factors affecting the recruitment and retention of Special 
Forces warrant officers and, specifically, focuses on two: (1) recruitment is drawn from a 
limited pool of eligible non-commissioned officers who face both the stigma of leaving 
the NCO ranks and pay disparities if they choose to transition; and (2) the lack of upward 
mobility through the senior warrant officer ranks.  
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A. BACKGROUND: HEALTH OF THE SPECIAL FORCES REGIMENT  
Special Forces warrant officers—military occupational specialty (MOS) 180A—
are vital to the health of the Special Forces Regiment. Their institutional knowledge is 
essential to the success of Special Operations Forces’ global endeavors. The Special 
Forces warrant officer’s role has evolved from that of a technician to a “continuity 
expert” in his field. The current description of the 180A is defined as: 
Special Forces (SF) warrant officers are combat leaders and staff officers. 
They are experienced subject matter experts in unconventional warfare, 
operations and intelligence fusion, and planning and execution at all levels 
across the operational continuum. They advise commanders on all aspects 
of special operations and are responsible for the integration of emerging 
technologies. (United States Army Warrant Officer Recruiting, 2014) 
Their regional expertise, gained from years of experience in a specific theatre of 
operations, is one of the key elements that the former commander of the Army, Navy, and 
Air Force unified Special Operations Command advocated the Regiment expand 
upon (Jean, 2009, p. 1). As Admiral Eric Olson, former commander of the United States 
Special Operations Command, stated during the National Defense Industrial 
Association conference in April 2009, “We need to develop what I call the Lawrences of 
the world . . . we need Lawrences of every region, every country of the world . . . and we 
need them there for a long time” (Jean, 2009, p. 1). Admiral Olson was referring to T. E. 
Lawrence, the highly successful British advisor to the Arab Revolt in World War I, who 
was popularized in the 1962 film Lawrence of Arabia in which a British soldier was able 
to unify and incite Arabs to defeat the Turks. The admiral elaborated: 
We don’t yet fully understand the nature of the conflicts we are in—the 
cultures, the societies of the areas in which we are operating. We don’t 
really speak the languages, or know the family histories, the tribal 
relationships, how business is done. (Jean, 2009, p. 1) 
In order to create the “Lawrences” that Olson was referring to, the Special Forces 
Regiment needs to harness the institutional knowledge gained from its Special Forces 
warrant officers’ years of experience. One way in which the Regiment can accomplish 
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this task is through the recruitment and retention of Special Forces warrant officers. 
Historically, the Special Forces Regiment has never reached 100 percent fill of its 
warrant officer grade plates. Over the past five years, based on unpublished data provided 
by U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC), the Special Forces Regiment has 
seen a continued statistically significant (p-value < 0.015) decrease in its warrant officer 
population from 88 percent of authorized strength in Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 to 84 percent 
in FY 2014(see Figures 1 through 5). Yet, according to the same data, the officer corps 
has actually increased (p-value < 0.038) and the non-commissioned officer (NCO) ranks 
have remained relatively flat from 99 percent in FY 2010 to 96 percent in FY 2014 
(p-value < 0.0957) (see Figures 1 through 5). In addition, data provided by HRC 
specifically for the year 2014 indicates the Regiment’s Special Forces warrant officer 
population is currently 16 percent under authorized strength (see Figure 5). If left 
unattended, the Regiment’s warrant officer population will continue to decline, depleting 
the Regiment of an extremely valuable asset. However, if addressed in the correct 
manner, the recruitment and retention of 180As will support Special Operations Forces 
and its missions well into the future. 
B. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND SCOPE  
The purpose of this thesis is to identify and examine several major factors 
affecting the recruitment and retention of Special Forces warrant officers. Once such 
factors are identified, this thesis will recommend a strategy to reverse this trend and 
strengthen the Regiment’s Special Forces Warrant Officer Corps.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY  
1. Research Question 
This thesis intends to answer the following question: What recruitment and 
retention modifications are needed to stop and, ultimately, reverse the declining trend in 
the Regiment’s Special Forces Warrant Officer Corps? 
In answering that question, this thesis will examine current policies and 
procedures for those factors possibly affecting the decline in Special Forces warrant 
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officers and identify to what degree each of these factors is attributable to that decline. 
This thesis will recommend options to increase the recruitment and retention of the 
Regiment’s Special Forces Warrant Officer Corps.  
2. Approach 
This thesis will analyze both quantitative and qualitative data.  
a. Quantitative  
This thesis will gather specific quantitative data regarding the Regiment’s Special 
Forces warrant officer strength from the Army’s Human Resources Command (HRC). 
This data will expose the Special Forces Regimental strength of its Special Forces 
warrant officers annually from 2010 through 2014. An analysis of this data will 
demonstrate the decline in the Regiment’s Special Forces warrant officer strength over 
the past five years, proving the need to focus on the recruitment and retention of the 
Special Forces warrant officers. Figures 1 through 5 depict the Regiment’s total Special 
Forces warrant officer assigned and authorized strength and subordinate group 
authorizations from 2010 through 2014.  
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180A INVENTORY DEC 2010 
Total 180A Strength 88% (519/590) 
 
                   
 
  ASGN AUTH % FILL 
W-5 30 17 176% 
W-4 93 77 121% 
W-3 114 136 84% 
W-1/W-2 282 360 78% 
TOTAL 519 590 88% 
*Data provided by U.S. Army Human Resources Command 
 
Figure 1.  Group Authorizations (Top) and Total 180A Inventory (Bottom) 
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180A INVENTORY NOV 2011 




          
 
  ASGN AUTH % FILL 
W-5 33 24 138% 
W-4 114 105 109% 
W-3 98 152 64% 
W-1/W-2 305 343 89% 
TOTAL 550 624 88% 
*Data provided by U.S. Army Human Resources Command 
Figure 2.  Group Authorizations (Top) and Total 180A Inventory (Bottom) 
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180A INVENTORY NOV 2012 




          
 
  ASGN AUTH % FILL 
W-5 37 24 154% 
W-4 119 90 132% 
W-3 123 163 75% 
W-1/W-2 258 343 75% 
TOTAL 537 620 87% 
*Data provided by U.S. Army Human Resources Command 
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180A INVENTORY DEC 2013 




          
 
  ASGN AUTH % FILL 
W-5 34 24 142% 
W-4 101 91 111% 
W-3 140 171 82% 
W-1/W-2 283 360 79% 
TOTAL 558 646 86% 
*Data provided by U.S. Army Human Resources Command 
Figure 4.  Group Authorizations (Top) and Total 180A Inventory (Bottom) 
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180A INVENTORY MAY 2014 




           
 
  ASGN AUTH % FILL 
W-5 34 18 189% 
W-4 95 85 112% 
W-3 138 184 75% 
W-1/W-2 273 359 76% 
TOTAL 540 646 84% 
*Data provided by U.S. Army Human Resources Command 
 

















This thesis will also use a semi-structured, qualitatively interpreted assessment 
process that utilizes grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Strauss 1995) to gather 
in-depth insights in conditions affecting the decline in Special Forces warrant officers. 
Since there has been little to no published data concerning this endeavor, based on their 
expertise and experience, 10 current and former, top leader Special Forces warrant 
officers were selected to participate in this study. Additionally, one Special Forces 
commander and two Special Forces command sergeant majors were included to provide 
the perspective of the command team.  
In order to gain insight into the major factors affecting recruitment and retention 
of the warrant officer regiment, discussions with senior experts were conducted over a 
two-week period. The discussions were semi-structured based on the senior expert’s 
responses, and all discussions were digitally recorded and transcribed by the author. Each 
transcription has been subsequently verified by the senior expert. The core of each 
discussion period included the following questions: However, for reasons of 
confidentiality, the identities of the participants have not been linked to their individual 
comments. Instead, almost all comments derived from these discussions have been cited 
as “name withheld.”  
 
1) What difficulties has the Regiment seen with regard to the recruitment of 
Special Forces non-commissioned officers?  
2) What are the current strategies regarding recruitment of Special Forces 
non-commissioned officers into the Special Forces warrant officer 
program?  
3) What retention difficulties has the Regiment experienced with regards to 
Special Forces warrant officers?  
4) How do we retain Special Forces warrant officers in the Regiment?  
5) In what ways does civilian contract work affect Special Forces warrant 
officer retention?  
6) What would be the expected benefit of changing the Regimental Table of 
Organization and Equipment with regards to recruitment and retention of 
Special Forces warrant officers?  
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7) Can 18As (Special Forces officers) who are selected for separation 
transition to a Special Forces warrant officer?  
D. FINDINGS  
This thesis finds that the Regiment’s issues with the recruitment and retention of 
Special Forces warrant officers are affected by the limited recruitment pool of eligible 
non-commissioned officers and the lack of upward mobility to the senior warrant officer 
ranks.  
The recruitment pool of eligible non-commissioned officers is limited by four 
major factors. First, the recruitment of Special Forces warrant officers can only draw 
from within the non-commissioned officer ranks of the Special Forces Regiment. This 
pool of candidates is further restricted by three additional factors that include a required 
skill set, a minimum language proficiency score of 1/1, which is quite low, in a 
designated language, and a set of service and school requirements, which include three 
years of service on an Operational Detachment Alpha and graduation from the Achilles 
Dagger course. Adding to these restrictions are four conditions within the Regiment, 
including competition for the best qualified non-commissioned officers, command 
emphasis on recruitment, pay disparity, and a perceived loyalty stigma, all of which 
further complicate the recruitment process. 
In terms of retention, this thesis identifies the inability to be promoted to the 
senior warrant officer grades as a significant factor influencing retention. Overall, the 
greatest retention difficulty correlates to the regiment’s over-strength CW5 grade plate 
population. 
This thesis concludes by offering several recommendations for improving both 
recruitment and retention, including reducing the perceived stigma of transitioning to the 
warrant officer Corps; initiating a SERB, or other reduction mechanism, to address the 
over strength of the CW5 grade, maintaining the incentive bonus; and formalizing the 
180A as an official member of the command team.    
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E. THESIS STRUCTURE  
This thesis proceeds as follows:  
 Chapter II examines the significance of being a professional warrant 
officer and the responsibilities to society associated with that position. 
This chapter provides a longitudinal review of the United States Army 
warrant officer origins and discusses the history of the United States Army 
Special Forces warrant officer.  
 Chapter III presents an overview of the policies for utilization of the 
Warrant Officer Corps.  
 Chapter IV analyzes the quantitative and qualitative data gathered through 
discussions with the Regiment’s “senior experts” regarding the 
sustainment of the Special Forces Regiment through the recruitment and 
retention of the Special Forces warrant officers.  
This analysis includes a review of formal military doctrine, specific policies 
governing the Special Forces warrant officers, knowledge gained from other scholarly 
writings and personal discussions with 13 of the Regiment’s “senior experts.” Finally, 
this thesis provides conclusions and recommendations pertaining to the recruitment and 
retention of the Special Forces warrant officers.  
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II. THE ORIGINS  
What does it mean to be a military professional and, more specifically, a 
professional military officer? First, consider the definition of what it means to be a 
professional. As defined by Huntington (1972) in his book The Soldier and the State: The 
Theory and Politics of Civil-Military, “professional” is defined as “the distinguishing 
characteristics of a profession as a special type of vocation are its expertise, 
responsibility, and corporateness” (p. 8). A professional individual is considered an 
expert within a specialized field through his knowledge and skill. This expertise can only 
be attained through protracted experience and education. It is crucial that the individual 
continue furthering his knowledge through institutions of higher education (Huntington, 
1972, p. 8). This gained knowledge ensures the essential expansion and transmission of 
his specific expertise. Huntington adds, “Contact is maintained between the academic and 
practical sides of a profession through journals, conference, and the circulation of 
personnel between practice and teaching” (p. 8). A professional’s education can be 
divided into two phases: the first, a broad background in common core subjects normally 
provided by a general educational institution; and the second, a focus on the specialized 
knowledge and skills directed towards a specific profession that are gained through 
unique institutions associated with the vocation itself. The professional individual is an 
expert who performs a service that is crucial to the livelihood of a society. Doctors, 
professors, law enforcement personnel, and soldiers are all necessary for the functioning 
of a society. Furthermore, as Huntington observes that “the client of every profession is 
society, individually or collectively” (p. 9). The central disposition of the individual’s 
service and unique specialty requires that he respond to society when called upon; this, in 
essence, is the responsibility of a professional.  
The career responsibility to respond to society when called upon distinguishes 
these specialized professionals from others. As Huntington (1972) proclaimed, “The 
responsibility to serve and devotion to his skill furnish the professional motive” (p. 9). 
Professional organizations preserve a sense of unity through their standards of 
competence and responsibility. The association with a professional organization, 
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possession of a specific skill set, and the responsibility to society distinguish the 
professional from the laymen. Furthermore—unlike professional individuals in the 
civilian sector—military professional officers maintain a specific central skill. Military 
officers contain the ability to manage violence during armed combat. Indeed, as 
Huntington asserts, “The direction, operation, and control of a human organization whose 
primary function is the application of violence is the peculiar skill of the officer” (p. 11).  
A. THE ORIGIN OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY WARRANT OFFICERS 
Public law in 1916 established a distinct and separate grade from traditional 
officers and enlisted members; those who served in this grade became known as warrant 
officers. Both historically and traditionally, United States Army warrant officers have 
been regarded as highly specialized technicians. The first warrant officers served as 
mates and chief engineers in the mine planter units of the Coast Artillery. In 1918, two 
warrant officer ranks were created, and within two years, there were more than a 
thousand authorized positions within the Army. However, Congress reduced this 
allocation by approximately 400 in 1926 (Brown, 1976, p. 19). A revision of the warrant 
officer rank took place in the 1930s when “the rank of warrant officer was a reward for 
outstanding performance to non-commissioned officers who were too old for a 
commission . . . this grade was not justified by organizational needs but was deemed 
justifiable solely on a reward basis” (Brown, 1976, p. 20).  
The War Department provided little supervision and maintained a decentralized 
management system of its warrant officers during the Second World War. For this 
reason, neither the Army’s warrant officers specific population, nor their individual 
specialties were accurately documented. Furthermore, dissimilar to the Officer Corps, the 
Warrant Officer Corps did not contain a prescribed career developmental model. 
However, as Brown (1976) observes, “Following World War II, an incentive concept was 
adopted which was based on the idea of capping each enlisted career field with a warrant 
officer position” (p. 19). The pay grade composition established in 1949 remains similar 
to the grade composition utilized today, which contains the following ranks: warrant 
officer-one, chief warrant officer-two, chief warrant officer-three, and chief warrant 
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officer-four. The rank of chief warrant officer-five was established in 1992 under the 
Warrant Officer Management Act (Warrant Officers Heritage Foundation, 2013). The 
competence of the Army warrant officer spans nearly 100 years of institutional 
background, making the warrant officer the natural choice for maintaining continuity 
within the Special Forces Regiment.  
B. THE ORIGIN OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL FORCES 
WARRANT OFFICER 
This thesis will next turn to the history of the United States Army Special Forces 
warrant officers. The following is the account of Colonel John H. Crerar regarding the 
initiative behind the creation of Special Forces warrant officers. Due to the lack of 
official documentation regarding the inception of the Special Forces warrant officer, 
Colonel Crerar composed a memorandum called “The Special Forces Warrant Officer, 
the Beginnings” for the current Special Forces warrant officers. Since nearly all of the 
documents concerning the creation of the Special Forces warrant officers were lost, 
Crerar’s account is generated primarily from his memory. According to Crerar (2013), 
“The development of the Special Forces warrant officer specialty was an inherent 
element in the devising of the Special Forces officer and enlisted specialties.”  
In 1981, Chief of Staff of the Army General Edward C. Meyer directed that a 
study be conducted concerning the problems associated with special operations 
management. The Special Operations Personnel Career Management Study—more 
commonly referred to as the “18 Program”—was headed by Colonel Charles Beckwith 
and Crerar. Colonel Beckwith and Colonel Crerar alone comprised the study group. 
Additionally, Colonel Crerar was recalled from his retirement specifically to partake in 
this effort. Throughout July and August of 1981, Beckwith and Crerar devised their list of 
recommendations for General Meyer. Aside from a few trips to Washington, DC, most of 
their time was spent in John F. Kennedy Hall on Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The 
colonels’ study included recommendations regarding all of the Army’s Special 
Operations Forces components. However, as Crerar (2013) states, “The problem that led 
to the consideration of warrant officers . . . was particular to [Army] Special Forces.” 
Under the current Table of Organization and Equipment for a Special Forces Operational 
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Detachment Alpha, the executive officer of the detachment was a lieutenant. Due to a 
lieutenant’s limited time in service and minimal exposure to a Special Forces Operational 
Detachment Alpha—primarily due to additional obligations from his branch—a 
lieutenant’s contributions to the detachment were limited. As Crerar succinctly notes, 
“Justly or not they [the lieutenants] were often viewed as burdens on their detachments.” 
The colonels researched a variety of ways to recruit better qualified lieutenants; the best 
officers seemed to originate from the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps, Officer 
Candidate School, and the pool of those who were directly commissioned.  
Even more important than possessing a formal education, the study group 
concluded that the most vital factor affecting successful leadership was previous military 
experience. Since a lieutenant served a mere four years prior to promotion to captain, and 
generally one year of that time was spent on additional schooling, most lieutenants did 
not gain sufficient experience to command a detachment effectively. The colonels first 
looked at the possibility of Officer Candidate School graduates, with their extensive 
enlisted time, filling this billet, but the numbers were still insufficient. According to 
Crerar (2013), “COL Beckwith suggested that Limited Duty Officers (LDO), similar to 
those in the Navy, who would be appointed from the ranks of senior SF Non-
Commissioned Officers (NCO) would offer a feasible solution.” This idea was practical, 
but it was discarded after further investigation found it too difficult to gain the needed 
approval from the deputy chief of staff for personnel, Lieutenant General Max Thurman. 
Colonel Crerar remembered a conversation in which Colonel Paris Davis, a former 
commander of the 10th Special Forces Group, mentioned one of his non-commissioned 
officers recommending the use of warrant officers in place of lieutenants. Sergeant First 
Class Scott Herbert, during a conversation with Davis on how to improve Special Forces, 
suggested the utilization of a warrant officer. Colonel Crerar proposed to Colonel 
Beckwith the idea of a warrant officer filling the position of a lieutenant. Beckwith at first 
thought the idea too radical, but upon further examination, concluded the concept would 
work.  
As Crerar (2013) recalls, “Warrant officers would not only have the military 
experience that the lieutenants lacked, but, as they would come, it was assumed, from the 
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Special Forces Non-Commissioned Officers, they would have specific SF relevant 
knowledge and experience.” Additionally, the Special Forces warrant officers would 
provide a level of consistency to the Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha that 
was not feasible through officers who transitioned off the detachment after only a year or 
two. Furthermore, warrant officers could serve longer on the detachment through warrant 
officer-one and chief warrant officer-two pay grades—currently, “WO1/CW2s must 
successfully serve for a minimum of three years at the SFODA level” (Department of the 
Army, 2010, p. 171). In addition to the aforementioned benefits, the recruitment of 
warrant officers from the Special Forces non-commissioned officer ranks would support 
reducing the promotion blockage of Special Forces non-commissioned officers at the 
higher grades. Further research was conducted to ensure the study group was confronting 
the “what if” questions regarding the introduction of a warrant officer on an Operational 
Detachment Alpha (Crerar, 2013). One of the most pertinent concerns focused on the 
promotion opportunities available to warrant officers after their Operational Detachment 
Alpha time. While the answer was not immediately available, it was presumed that 
Special Forces warrant officers would ascend to positions within the battalion, group and 
Special Operations Command levels (Crerar, 2013).  
On August 18, 1981, Major General James B. Vaught, accompanied by Colonels 
Beckwith and Crerar, briefed the Army’s chief of staff, General Edward C. Meyer, on the 
entire study and the proposed effects if implemented. The chief of staff had no objections 
to the proposed actions; he directed the study group brief its findings to the assistant chief 
of staff for Intelligence, the commander of the Military Personnel Center, and the Deputy 
Chief of Staff for Personnel (Crerar, 2013). After Colonel Beckwith retired, Major Lyle 
Drake joined Colonel Crerar and continued pressing the study group’s findings. 
According to Crerar (2013), “Almost every subordinate division and branch of each 
Army Staff directorate and each element of the Military Personnel Center were briefed, 
either formally or informally.” The study group encountered opposition by numerous 
offices and individuals, but Crerar and Drake were able to explain the relevance of the 
group’s findings, which quelled the oppositions’ doubts. Ironically, the Warrant Officers 
Division of the Military Personnel Center was opposed to adding Special Forces warrant 
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officers to their division. The chief of the division thought that the proposal was feasible 
but unacceptable due to the fact that the Special Forces warrant officers would have to 
“command” the detachment in the absence of a commissioned officer (Crerar, 2013). 
Colonel Crerar reminded the chief of the division that warrants commanded aircraft and 
ocean vessels; why, he asked, could a warrant officer not command a detachment? 
Even though the Warrant Officers Division of Military Personnel Center remained 
against the concept, the division did not present any objections when Major General 
Arter, chief of the Military Personnel Center, was briefed on January 15, 1982. The 
deputy chief of staff for Personnel, Lieutenant General Thurman, and the deputy chief of 
staff for Operations, Lieutenant General William R. Richardson, signed a memorandum 
that was later presented to the Army’s Chief of Staff, General Edward C. Meyer, and 
forwarded to the Secretary of the Army, the Honorable John Marsh. The vital excerpt 
read, “We have agreed, after careful assessment, that a separate career system for Special 
Operations personnel is feasible and appropriate for enlisted personnel (CMF 18), 
warrant officers (MOS 018), and commissioned officers (SC 18)” (Crerar, 2013). The 
decision was made, and within one year, the position of the Special Forces warrant 
officer was created. Colonel Crerar, along with Colonel Beckwith and later Major Drake, 
had fought an uphill battle to initiate the inception of the warrant officer in Special 
Forces. 
While both the origins of the United States Army warrant officer and the history 
surrounding the creation of the Army’s Special forces warrant officer are valuable and 
intriguing, neither account clearly illuminates the current problems concerning the 
decline in the recruitment and retention of the Special Forces warrant officers.  
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III. UTILIZATION POLICIES FOR WARRANT OFFICERS 
The policies for utilization, conditions for selecting warrant officer positions, and 
the directives for conversion to the present warrant officer military occupational specialty 
system were announced on April 12, 1960 in the Department of the Army Circular 611–7 
publication. In 1966—six years after the publication of the Department of the Army 
Circular 611–7—the Department of the Army formed a study group to develop a Warrant 
Officer Professional Management System. The group was tasked to develop an official 
Warrant Officer Career Program, which would support the Army’s requirements in the 
utilization of the warrant officer and provide adequate career opportunities to these 
officers to ensure further recruitment of quality personnel. After examining the Warrant 
Officer Corps’ “pay, promotion, utilization, and education,” the group effectively 
initiated a tri-level education system that was established in 1972 (Department of the 
Army, 2010, p. 4). This system provided formal training for warrant officers throughout 
the entry, intermediate, and advance levels. Personnel Command—now the Army Human 
Resources Command—initiated the Warrant Officer Division in 1974. This division 
provided centralized management to all warrant officers, apart from those in the Judge 
Advocate and Army Medical Department. Since warrant officers were excluded in the 
1981 Defense Officer Personnel Management Act—in which the officer career 
management was codified—the Army’s Chief of Staff, General John A. Wickham, 
chartered the Total Warrant Officer Study. The study, initiated in 1984, created a new 
definition for the warrant officer as follows: 
An officer appointed by warrant by the Secretary of the Army based upon 
a sound level of technical and tactical competence. The warrant officer is 
the highly specialized expert and trainer, who, by gaining progressive 
levels of expertise and leadership, operates, maintains, administers, and 
manages the Army’s equipment, support activities, or technical systems 
for an entire career. (Warrant Officers Heritage Foundation, 2013, 
1957 section) 
In December of 1991, six years after the publication of the Total Warrant Officer 
Study, the Warrant Officer Management Act was signed into law. This document is the 
current foundation for warrant officer management today and serves as the counterpart of 
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the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act. The Warrant Officer Management Act 
provides for management of “warrant officers by years of warrant officer service rather 
than total service, [and] automatic RA integration at the Chief Warrant Officer-3 (CW3) 
level” (Department of the Army, 2010, p. 4). In addition, the act formally “created the 
rank of CW5, permitted selective retention and retirement, and eliminated the dual 
promotion system” (Department of the Army, 2010, p. 4). The Army’s Chief of Staff, 
General Gordon R. Sullivan, approved the Warrant Officer Leader Development Action 
Plan in February of 1992. This document furthered the groundwork of the Total Warrant 
Officer System and the Warrant Officer Management Act. The Warrant Officer Leader 
Development Action Plan focused on training, assignments and civilian education for 
warrant officers; it provided a blueprint for future warrant officers to follow. The Army 
Training and Leader Development Panel was charted by the Army’s Chief of Staff in 
2000, General Eric K. Shinseki. Under this study, the original warrant officer definition 
provided by the Total Warrant Officer Study was revised. The current definition of the 
Army warrant officer reads: 
The warrant officer of the Future Force is a self-aware and adaptive 
technical expert, combat leader, trainer, and advisor. Through progressive 
levels of expertise in assignments, training, and education, the warrant 
officer administers, manages, maintains, operates, and integrates Army 
systems and equipment across the full range of Army operations. Warrant 
officers are innovative integrators of emerging technologies, dynamic 
teachers, confident warfighters, and developers of specialized teams of 
Soldiers. They support a wide range of Army missions throughout their 
careers. (Department of the Army, 2010, p. 4) 
Today’s Army’s warrant officers are recruited, trained, developed, educated, evaluated, 
promoted and separated through the policies and procedures of the Officer Professional 
Management System.  
However, despite the fact that the Army has utilized warrant officers for nearly 
100 years, none of the previously mentioned policies reference the warrant officer as part 
of the command team. Yet Special Forces warrant officers, in the ranks of WO1 through 
CW2 and occasionally CW3, serve on Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alphas 
(SFOD-A) as the assistant detachment commander (ADC) and assume the role of 
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detachment commander in the absence of the commander. On a Special Forces 
Operational Detachment, the 180A is officially part of the command team. Primarily, the 
ADC serves as the detachment’s chief of staff while focusing on operations and 
intelligence fusion during mission planning and execution (Department of the Army, 
2010, p. 171). Some Special Forces warrant officers serve as commanders of specialized 
teams (United States Army Warrant Officer Recruiting, 2014). Special Forces CW3s 
primarily serve as company operations officers, focusing on operations and intelligence 
fusion during mission planning and execution; they also serves as senior warrant officer 
advisors to the commander regarding all warrant officer related professional development 
(Department of the Army, 2010, p. 172).  
Additionally, CW3s can serve as battalion assistant operations warrant officers, 
instructors, or doctrine writers at the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special 
Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), and staff officers at the United States 
Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) (USASFC(A)), United States Army Special 
Operations Command (USASOC), United States Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM), Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), or a Theater Special 
Operations Command (TSOC) (Department of the Army, 2010, p. 172). Special Forces 
CW4s primarily serve as battalion operations warrant officers focusing on operations and 
intelligence fusion during mission planning and execution. Additionally, CW4s serve as 
senior warrant officer advisors regarding all warrant officer-associated professional 
development. Furthermore, Special Forces CW4s remain eligible to serve as a Special 
Forces group’s assistant operations warrant officer, staff officer at USASFC(A), 
USASOC, USSOCOM, JSOC, TSOC, or Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) 
(Department of the Army, 2010, p. 172). The Special Forces CW5s serve as Command 
Chief Warrant Officers (CCWO) for Special Forces groups, TSOCs, USASFC, and the 
Chief Warrant Officer of the Branch (CWOB), advising their commanders on all warrant 
officer related professional development and other interests as directed. Additionally, 
CW5s can serve as group operations warrant officers, focusing on operations and 
intelligence fusion concerning mission planning and execution (Department of the Army, 
2010, p. 173).  
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The Special Forces Regiment’s Table of Organization and Equipment regarding 
warrant officers was revised on September 9, 2011 when Brigadier General Edward M. 
Reeder signed a policy that created the Command Chief Warrant Officer at the Special 
Forces Group headquarters level (United States Army Special Forces Command 
[USASFC], 2011). Each Special Forces Group’s “command team” is now comprised of 
the colonel, command chief warrant officer, and the command sergeant major. This 
structural change was proposed in 2005 by the United States Army Special Forces 
Command, which asked the commanders of each active Special Forces Group if they 
concurred with creating a position in the command team for their senior warrant officer. 
According to Thomas, “We believe the time and need for change is today . . . this is an 
opportune time to transform the 180A program to ensure it is adapting to ‘today’s’ 
reality” (June 28, 2005).  
In that regard, this thesis will investigate whether including the Special Forces 
warrant officers into the command teams—at both the company and battalion levels—
will encourage both recruitment and retention for the Regiment. Furthermore, while the 
historical utilization policies of the United States Army warrant officer are interesting, 
not one of these policies clearly addresses the current problems regarding the decline in 
both the recruitment and retention of the Special Forces warrant officers.  
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM 
 Over the past five years, the recruitment of Special Forces non-commissioned 
officers into the warrant officer program has seen a continued statistically significant (p-
value < 0.015) decrease in its warrant officer population from 88 percent in fiscal year 
(FY) 2010 to 84 percent in FY 2014 (see Table 1). The current total 180A shortage of 16 
percent (540 assigned /646 authorized) is misleading in the fact that the current inventory 
is top heavy in terms of rank structure (see Table 1).1 
Table 1.   2014 180A Assigned/Authorized Numbers 
  ASGN AUTH % FILL 
W-5 34 18 189% 
W-4 95 85 112% 
W-3 138 184 75% 
W-1/W-2 273 359 76% 
TOTAL 540 646 84% 
*Data for 2014 provided by Human Resources Command 
 
The current assigned number of CW4s and CW5s represent 24 percent of the 
current warrant officer population, which is 25 percent above current authorizations (see 
Table 1). One potential reason for the Regiment’s over populated CW5 grade plate is the 
fact that there remains no mechanism, with the exception of retirement, by which to 
remove CW5s from service. In accordance with AR135-32, CW5s are authorized to 
remain on active duty until age 62, or 30 years of warrant officer service. This, in turn, 
affects the subordinate grade plates’ ability to be promoted. 
As the Special Forces community looks at current operations and future growth, it 
quite likely needs to address the issue that its junior warrant officers (W1–CW3) are 
actually 24.3 percent under strength (see Table 1). In fact, over the last five years, this 
                                                 
1 The total 180A shortage of 16 percent also hides the SF Group shortage of 24 percent (407/535). 
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group has only averaged 78.3 percent assigned with the highest assigned level (81.4 
percent) occurring in 2011. This critical shortage was clearly expressed by one 
commander who commented that, when he assumed command, the Special Forces 
warrant officers were “around 50 percent strength at the W01 and CW2 ranks. Half of my 
ODAs did not have assistant detachment commanders” (name withheld, personal 
communication, May 1, 2014).  
Considering the current international disorder—and the understanding that W1s 
and CW3s work at the Operational Detachment Alpha level—it appears paramount that 
the Regiment focus on the recruitment of Special Forces warrant officers in order to 
negate this continued downward trend. 
A. RECRUITMENT PROCESS AND PROBLEMS 
The current shortfall in warrant officers aside, the Regiment, according to one 
senior warrant officer, needs to access approximately 58 new warrant officers each year 
to maintain current levels (name withheld, personal communication, August 8, 2014). 
Unfortunately, the Regiment has historically failed to achieve this number. The Warrant 
Officer Candidate School—now the Warrant Officer Technical and Tactical Course—
only graduated 21 new Special Forces warrant officers in June of 2002. The following 
class contained only 12 graduates, and the subsequent class contained zero graduates.2 As 
a second senior warrant officer observed, “We have had an ebb and flow of recruitment 
for some time, the last time we met our recruiting goal was approximately seven years 
ago” (name withheld, personal communication, August 8, 2014). The recruitment of non-
commissioned officers into the Special Forces warrant officer program, though, remains 
difficult due to the small pool from which candidates are eligible. The current process 
and set of policies, under ideal conditions, establishes a narrow pool of candidates. 
1. Process 
In order to sustain the Special Forces Regiment, the Regiment needs to continue 
to recruit the right Special Forces non-commissioned officers at the right time during 
                                                 
2 This is drawn from the author’s personal experience as a 2002 cohort graduate. 
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their career. There are currently four major factors that limit this pool of non-
commissioned officers as potential candidates. First, the recruitment of Special Forces 
warrant officers can only originate from within the non-commissioned officer ranks of 
the Special Forces Regiment. This establishes an initial recruiting pool that is further 
reduced in size by the fact the current non-commissioned officer strength in the Regiment 
is at 96% (personal communication with 180A Proponency, Human Resource Command, 
November 4, 2014). Within this initial pool of candidates, there are three additional 
factors affecting recruitment: a required skill set, language proficiency, and service 
requirements, all of which further restrict the size of the recruitment pool. In order to be 
eligible for recruitment, the non-commissioned officer must have completed the Special 
Forces Qualification Course and maintain a military occupational specialty as an 18B 
(weapons sergeant), 18C (engineer sergeant), 18D (medical sergeant), 18E 
(communications sergeant), 18F (intelligence sergeant), or 18Z (operations sergeant). 
Additionally, the non-commissioned officer must have a minimum Defense Language 
Proficiency Test (DLPT) score of 1/1 in his designated language. Finally, the non-
commissioned officer must have served on an Operational Detachment Alpha for a 
minimum of three years, graduated from the Achilles Dagger course, and have less than 
17 years of active federal service. These additional constraints reduce the pool of 
candidates. A U.S. Army Research Institute review of the September 2003 Enlisted 
Master File (EMF) suggests that this pool of eligible candidates could be as low as 
2–6 percent of the SF NCO population.   
The Regiment attempts to target and incentivize the best candidates from this 
small pool to transfer into the 180A program. Under the best of situations, this narrow 
recruiting pool makes achieving recruitment goals difficult, but there are at least three 
additional conditions within the Regiment complicating the recruitment process: 




Understandably, one will always find senior enlisted members who are 
completely loyal to the NCO Corps; they have developed their young soldiers to emulate 
them. As one senior warrant officer observed in confirming this tendency, “Undoubtedly, 
as the NCO Corps develops these great non-commissioned officers, they want to keep 
them within their ranks” (name withheld, personal communication, August 7, 2014). Four 
senior experts for this thesis commented on the fact that some non-commissioned officers 
simply do not want to become warrant officers. As one senior warrant officer noted, 
“Some have aspirations of being a team sergeant or SGM, which is acceptable because 
we need stellar NCOs as well” (name withheld, personal communication, August 8, 
2014). Supporting this observation, another senior leader stated that “the NCO Corps has 
some phenomenal individuals who want to become team sergeants, and rightfully so, 
since they are the backbone of the team” (name withheld, personal communication, 
August 8, 2014). Several additional senior Special Forces warrant officers shared the 
same sentiment and also recognized that although it is paramount that the Corps selects 
the right NCOs to transition, it is completely understandable that many NCOs want to be 
a CSM (name withheld, personal communication, September 18, 2014), and as one CSM 
stated, “Many junior NCOs, like me, wanted to be a team sergeant” (name withheld, 
personal communication, October 13, 2014). Consequently, the desire to recruit aspiring, 
top performing NCOs can be problematic, as stated by one CSM who offered, “Too many 
times commanders and CSMs take it personal when soldiers within their formations want 
to challenge themselves by attending other courses/schools within the Army; they should 
see it as an opportunity to make the entire force better” (name withheld, personal 
communication, October 13, 2014). This conflict between the NCO corps and Special 
Forces fosters a tension between two competing choices: to groom top performing NCOs 
to become future CSMs in the Regiment, or to support and emphasize a transition to a 
warrant officer.  
A healthy competitive environment for the best qualified non-commissioned 
officer requires strong command emphasis and leadership. During the discussions 
conducted for this thesis, issues regarding the probability of promotion and the lack of 
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command emphasis on a solid recruitment program were specifically addressed by 
several senior experts. As one senior warrant officer stated, “The number one issue 
affecting the lack of adequate recruitment of Special Forces non-commissioned officers 
into the Special Forces Warrant Officer Corps is the lack of command emphasis” (name 
withheld, personal communication, October 3, 2014). One CSM commented that “until 
the Warrant Officer Corps initiates a better way to manage its most senior ranks—and 
shows there is room for promotion—why crossover?” (name withheld, personal 
communication, October 13, 2014). One possible solution would be for command teams 
from the battalion level and higher to set clear policies that place the emphasis on filling 
the ranks with the right personnel.  
Almost one-third (4/13) of the senior experts for this thesis commented directly 
on the issue of pay disparity. All believed that one major factor in the decline in 
recruitment was primarily due to the reduction in pay graduates experienced when 
transitioning from a Sergeant First Class to a Warrant Officer-One (name withheld, 
personal communication, August 11, 2014). The Special Forces Regiment’s leadership 
realized the disparity in pay was creating a grave sustainment problem. By 2005, warrant 
officer-one(s) began to receive “save-pay,” which offset their reduction in salary. 
Although this compensation assisted current Warrant Officer-One(s), it was not enough 
to attract the high quality NCOs needed to sustain the Special Forces Warrant Officer 
Corps. Today’s Special Forces non-commissioned officers who successfully complete the 
20-week Warrant Officer Technical and Tactical Course are eligible to receive an 
accession bonus of $20,000 through the Critical Skills Accessions Bonus (CSAB). 
Qualified warrant officers will be paid a lump sum amount of $20,000 
upon technical certification at completion of the Warrant Officer 
Technical and Tactical certification Course for MOS 180A, incurring a 
six-year active duty service obligation upon approval by AHRC. (Military 
Personnel HRC, 2013) 
This bonus was enacted to increase the retention of Special Operation Forces by 
assisting in the recruitment of Special Forces warrant officers (HRC, 2013). However, the 
continuing reduction of the military’s budget threatens this accession’s bonus 
authorization every year.  
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However, warrant officer pay was a significant issue prior to the targeted pay 
raises. Previously, according to a senior leader, there was no accessions bonus incentive 
or retention incentive bonus to balance out this disparity (name withheld, personal 
communication, August 7, 2014). As a second senior leader asked, “Why would an 
individual volunteer to take on more responsibility as the Assistant Detachment 
Commander (ADC), and potentially be the detachment commander, and make less 
monetarily?” (name withheld, personal communication, August 7, 2014). A senior 
warrant officer recalled that during a visit to the Office of Economic and Manpower 
Analysis (OEMA) at West Point in 2003, “we gleaned the information on pay disparities 
and thus initiated and requested the 180A Critical Skills Accessions Bonus (CSAB)” 
(name withheld, personal communication, August 7, 2014). Ironically, the OEMA data 
gathered was utilized then by USASOC to initiate an enlisted critical skills retention 
bonus (CSRB); however, the 180As were not included. Fortunately, the 180As were able 
to readdress the issue and initiate the CSRB for warrant officers as well (name withheld, 
personal communication, August 7, 2014). In that regard, one CSM noted that the best 
recruitment tool available to offset the loss in pay when transitioning from a Sergeant 
First Class (SFC) to a Warrant Officer-One (WO1) was to offer “save pay.” He stated, “I 
believe that offering save pay is a better incentive than the CSAB of $20,000” (name 
withheld, personal communication, September 30, 2014). Unfortunately, as a senior 
warrant officer pointed out, there exist numerous NCOs who do not know about the 
CSAB.  
I believe an improved recruitment marketing approach within the groups 
would prove beneficial. A simple poster promulgating the $20,000 CSAB, 
leadership opportunities, promotion opportunities, extended ODA time, 
military schools, and higher civilian education opportunities incurred 
when transitioning to a warrant officer would greatly assist in our 
recruitment effort. (name withheld, personal communication, August 8, 
2014) 
A second obstacle to recruitment, in addition to the perceived disparity in pay, 
was expressed by a majority (8/13) of the senior experts, who feel a stigma still exists—
perpetrated by the NCO Corps—with regard to a soldier transitioning to a Special Forces 
warrant officer. For example, one senior leader observed,  
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In my 18 years in the Regiment, the problem I saw early on was the stigma 
against becoming a warrant officer, or an officer for that matter. I saw 
multiple instances where team sergeants—and other senior NCOs—would 
try to talk a junior NCO out of becoming a warrant officer. (name 
withheld, personal communication, May 1, 2014)  
The impression exists that senior NCOs promulgate the perception of disloyalty to the 
NCO Corps—and the Regiment—if an individual decides to transition to a warrant 
officer. According to one leader, “Overall, the greatest difficulty has been the stigma that 
the NCO has no loyalty to the NCO Corps” (name withheld, personal communication, 
August 11, 2014). However, this perception is not universal throughout the regiment. One 
senior warrant officer stated his group sustained no stigma issues regarding the 
recruitment of NCOs into the Warrant Officer Corps (name withheld, personal 
communication, September 18, 2014). Furthermore, one CSM stated he had not 
witnessed a great deal of difficulty regarding recruitment of Special Forces NCOs into 
the warrant officer program; rather, he actually observed a growth of Special Forces 
warrant officers at the detachment level (name withheld, personal communication, 
September 30, 2014). Overall, it appears there still exists a concern with the loyalty 
stigma associated when an NCO attempts to transition to the Warrant Officer Corps. As 
noted by one senior warrant officer, “We still have some senior NCOs that do not support 
the program 100 percent . . . they begrudgingly support it” (name withheld, personal 
communication, August 8, 2014).  
B. RETENTION PROBLEMS 
Five of the 13 senior experts directly referenced the inability to be promoted as a 
factor influencing retention. The remaining eight senior experts did not have a direct 
observation of promotion as a potential issue and therefore did not comment on it. 
Overall, the greatest retention difficulty correlates to the regiment’s over-strength CW5 
grade plate population. For example, the Regiment had 51 CW4s eligible for CW5 in 
2014, four above the zone, 20 in the primary zone, and 27 below the zone. Out of the 51 
eligible CW4s, though, only six were selected for promotion to the grade of CW5 (name 
withheld, personal communication, August 8, 2014). As noted by one senior warrant 
officer, the younger warrant officer population is contemplating, “What is my potential 
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for promotion now . . . when the CW4 and CW5 grade plates are over strength?” (name 
withheld, personal communication, August 8, 2014). According to a second senior leader, 
“Senior CW3s and CW4s recognize the Regiment contains 20 authorized positions for 
CW5s, yet we currently have 35 CW5s still serving; with an additional six that were just 
selected for promotion.” He added,  
To alleviate this, we need to initiate a Selective Early Retirement Board. 
The Regiment needs to remove those CW5s that are only moving laterally, 
or filling CW3 or CW4 billets. (name withheld, personal communication, 
September 18, 2014)  
The Regiment currently contains some very talented CW4s who may be forced out 
because the Regiment has too many CW5s in service. As a senior warrant officer 
admitted, “The biggest waste I have seen is at the CW4 level, the promotions are just not 
there” (name withheld, personal communication, August 11, 2014). That warrant 
officer’s assessment was supported by others, one of whom acknowledged, “There is no 
process in place to ensure CW5s retire in a timely basis to make room for upward 
mobility of mid-grade warrant officers” (name withheld, personal communication, 
October 3, 2014). The promotion to CW4 and CW5 is strained due to the limited number 
of billets. One CSM stated, “There should be a separation board or a Retention Control 
Point—built into the rank structure—in order to sustain the most qualified warrant 
officers” (name withheld, personal communication, October 13, 2014).  
One additional area of noted concern among the senior experts is the impact of 
bonuses on retention. Dissimilar to the NCO Corps, the opportunity for warrant officers 
to receive bonuses is limited. Since the Regiment’s senior warrant officers decided to 
decline the Assignment Incentive Pay, the qualified mid-grade warrant officers face a 
limited chance at promotion and no longer have the opportunity to receive the AIP bonus 
(name withheld, personal communication, October 13, 2014). While against receiving the 
AIP bonus, a senior leader noted, “Although we still receive $20,000 for the CSAB and 
$150,000 for the CSRB, the Army withdrew the ability to draw both bonuses 
concurrently . . . this included other warrant officer MOSs as well” (name withheld, 
personal communication, August 7, 2014). Accordingly, individuals with 12 years of 
service are advised to accept the CSAB, and those with 16 years of service are advised to 
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apply for the CSRB after two years (see Table 2). In order to retain high-quality Special 
Forces operators, some individuals believe the Regiment must continue incentivizing 
through bonuses; others speculate these bonuses will vanish due to current financial 
constraints (name withheld, personal communication, August 7, 2014). 
Additionally, individual senior experts commented on the CSRB and outside 
organizations affecting retention. For example, one senior warrant officer contends the 
CSRB remains relevant in order to keep warrant officers until 25 years of service (name 
withheld, personal communication, August 8, 2014). Essentially, Special Forces warrant 
officers who have completed their six-year active duty service obligation and are 
retirement eligible possess—as a second senior warrant officer observed—a wealth of 
experience and knowledge. Consequently, they become marketable to outside 
organizations. (name withheld, personal communication, September 18, 2014). Such 
civilian organizations typically offer a greater salary when compared to the Army. 
Table 2.   Critical Skills Retention Bonus  
(after Under Secretary of Defense, 2013) 
Grade  YOS  2 Years  3 Years  4 Years  5 Years   6 Years 
CW2/CW3  19‐23  $18,000  $30,000  $50,000  $75,000  $150,000 
 
 
However, a few of the senior experts noted that the Critical Skills Retention Bonus 
(CSAB) has bolstered the Regiment’s ability to retain its talented Special Forces warrant 
officers for the future and that both the (CSAB) and the Critical Skills Retention Bonus 
(CSRB) have assisted with the recruitment and retention of the Regiment’s Special 
Forces warrant officers (names withheld, personal communications, August 7 & 8, 2014). 
Unfortunately, though, these financial initiatives still appear insufficient by 
themselves to meet recruitment and retention objectives.  
C. POTENTIAL REMEDIES 
Assessment of the collected data were initially analyzed using grounded theory to 
identify the range of concepts and themes within the data set related to potential solutions 
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for the Regiment’s recruitment and retention problems. This thesis used categorical 
analysis to identify passages and group related themes to identify basic concepts and to 
potentially identify a set of concepts with broad consensus among the leaders. Senior 
expert’s responses were classified using three levels of assessment (i.e., disagree, 
moderately agree, and strongly agree) for each of the identified concepts. These ratings 
were assigned based on responses to the core set of discussion questions. Passages from 
all parts of the discussion were coded, examined, and used to confirm or modify the 
assessment. Table 3 provides the categorized scores for each of the 13 senior leaders for 
each major recruitment and retention concept. The five concepts identified in Table 3 
offer potential methods of improving both recruitment and retention. 







Command Emphasis of the 180A 
Program 11 0 0 2 
Reduce Perceived Stigma of the NCO 
Corps 7 1 1 4 
Initiate a SERB for the CW5 Grade 10 0 0 3 
Maintain Monetary Incentive 12 0 0 1 
Formalize the 180A as an Official 
Member of the Command Team 10 1 2 0 
 
In order to further stimulate the recruitment and retention of the Special Forces 
warrant officer, the Regiment’s commanders may need to demonstrate greater emphasis 
of the 180A program. From the non-commissioned officers’ accessions into the Special 
Forces warrant officer program, through their professional development and career 
management, commanders and command sergeant majors may need to make the 
recruitment of Special Forces warrant officers a priority. 
Senior leaders should take a more active role in addressing the perceived stigma 
associated with a Special Forces non-commissioned officer transitioning to a Special 
Forces warrant officer. The Special Forces warrant officer program only strengthens the 
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Regiment; the issue of disloyalty to the non-commissioned officers Corps should be 
replaced with a sense of the loyalty to the Regiment. 
The quantitative data gathered from the Army’s Human Resources Command in 
May 2014 illustrates the Regiment’s Special Forces warrant officer CW5 grade plate 
population at 189 percent strength, because there is no incentive for CW5s to leave, and 
no structural process for them to be encouraged to leave. Irrefutably, this over-strength 
grade plate hampers the upward growth of the Regiment’s CW4 population. 
Consequently, stellar CW4s are being forced out of service due to the Regiment’s 
inability to mandate a retirement of its CW5 grade plate. The Regiment should consider 
initiating a Selective Early Retirement Board for CW5s who no longer remain relevant to 
the force. 
The Regiment should continue its efforts to incentivize the recruitment of its 
Special Forces non-commissioned officers into the Special Forces warrant officer 
program and incentivize the current Special Forces warrant officers to remain in service 
beyond their six year active duty service obligation. Some incentive bonuses should be 
continued in order to ensure no pay disparities exist when a Special Forces non-
commissioned officer transitions to a Special Forces warrant officer. 
The Special Forces warrant officer, at both the company and battalion levels, 
should be included as part of the command team. At the Operational Detachment Alpha 
level, the Special Forces warrant officer is the assistant detachment commander; he 
commands the detachment in the absence of the commander and commands half of the 
element during split detachment operations. According to the Table of Organization and 
Equipment, the next level in the organization at which the Special Forces warrant officer 
officially is considered part of the command team occurs at the Special Forces Group 
headquarters. Including Special Forces warrant officers into the command teams earlier 
in their career may properly develop them for future service as the group—or higher—
command chief warrant officer. 
The next chapter will summarize the findings from this thesis and offer 
concluding thoughts and recommendations based on these findings. 
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V. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis examined the significance of being a professional officer, provided a 
brief history of the United States Army warrant officer, discussed the origins of the 
United States Army Special Forces warrant officer, and presented an overview of the 
utilization policies for the Warrant Officer Corps as a whole. The health of the Special 
Forces Warrant Officer Corps relies on the continued recruitment of the Special Forces 
non-commissioned officer and the sustainment of the current Special Forces warrant 
officer. Therefore, the Regiment should address both the current and historical problems 
surrounding the continued decline of its warrant officer population.  
Through gathered quantitative and qualitative data, this thesis identified a 
historical problem concerning the recruitment and retention of the Special Forces warrant 
officer. The quantitative data gathered from the Army’s Human Resources Command 
depicts a continuous decline in the health of the Special Forces warrant officer cohort 
from FY 2010 through FY 2014. As of May, 2014, the 180A inventory validated the 
overall strength of the Special Forces Warrant Officer Corps as 16 percent under its 
authorized strength—junior warrant officers (W1-CW3) are actually 24.3 percent under 
strength. Building upon the findings from the quantitative data gathered, this thesis 
examined seven research questions centered on the problems surrounding the recruitment 
and retention of the Special Forces warrant officer. First, what difficulty has the 
Regiment seen with regard to the recruitment of Special Forces non-commissioned 
officers? Second, what are the current strategies regarding recruitment of Special Forces 
non-commissioned officers into the Special Forces warrant officer program? Third, what 
retention difficulty has the Regiment experienced with regards to Special Forces warrant 
officers? Fourth, how do we retain Special Forces warrant officers in the Regiment? 
Fifth, in what ways does civilian contract work affect Special Forces warrant officer 
retention? Sixth, what would be the expected benefit of changing the Regimental Table of 
Organization and Equipment with regards to recruitment and retention of Special Forces 
warrant officers? Seventh, can 18As (Special Forces officers) who are selected for 
separation transition to a Special Forces warrant officer?  
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The qualitative data gathered through conducting discussions with 13 of the 
Regiment’s top experts exposed numerous problems regarding both the recruitment of 
Special Forces non-commissioned officers into the Special Forces warrant officer 
program and the retention of the Regiment’s current Special Forces warrant officers 
Corps. Based on the consensus from the field research conducted, this thesis proposes the 
following principal modifications be incorporated to reverse this historical trend and 
bring the Regiment’s Special Forces Warrant Officer Corps to 100 percent.  
A. FORMALIZE THE 180A AS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF THE 
COMMAND TEAM 
One area of influence that would greatly assist in the recruitment and retention of 
the Special Forces warrant officer is the revision of the Regiment’s Table of Organization 
and Equipment—or a policy change initiated by USASFC—to include the 180A as an 
integral part of the command team. The Special Forces warrant officer, at both the 
company and battalion levels, should be included as part of the command team. At the 
Operational Detachment Alpha level, the Special Forces warrant officer is the assistant 
detachment commander; he commands the detachment in the absence of the commander 
and commands half of the element during split detachment operations. According to the 
Table of Organization and Equipment, the next level in the organization for which he 
officially is considered part of the command team is at the Special Forces Group 
headquarters. 
Incorporating Special Forces warrant officers into the command teams earlier in 
their career could properly develop them for future service as the group—or higher—
command chief warrant officer. Moreover, exposing 180As to a command team climate 
likely will prove beneficial to the Regiment as a whole.  
Whether through a Table of Organization and Equipment change or through the 
initiation of a policy, the inclusion of the Special Forces warrant officer into the 
command team, at both the company and battalion levels, would likely assist in the 
recruitment and retention of the Regiment’s warrant officer population. Moreover, this 
incentive would cost the Regiment nothing. 
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B. MAINTAIN INCENTIVE BONUSES 
As confirmed by the qualitative data gathered, the Regiment should continue to 
incentivize the recruitment of its Special Forces non-commissioned officers into the 
Special Forces warrant officer program and incentivize the current Special Forces 
warrant officers to remain in service beyond their six-year active duty service obligation. 
Some type of incentive bonus, therefore, should be continued in order to ensure that pay 
disparities do not exist when a Special Forces non-commissioned officer transitions to a 
Special Forces warrant officer.  
The Critical Skills Accession Bonus (CSAB) has successfully bridged the pay gap 
that negatively affected the recruitment of Special Forces non-commissioned officers in 
previous years. Since the ability to receive the bonus tax-free is diminishing—due to the 
reduction of combat deployments—the Regiment might consider increasing the incentive 
bonus to counter this issue. As an alternative to offering the CSAB, the Regiment could 
promote active duty E-7s directly to CW2—a promotion mechanism currently used by 
the National Guard. However, it should be noted that this change could reduce the 
individual’s amount of time on an Operational Detachment Alpha, and increased time on 
an ODA is one reason non-commissioned officers choose to transition.  
The Regiment’s Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB), currently offered to the 
Special Forces non-commissioned officers, should remain equivalent to the incentive 
offered to the Special Forces warrant officers. A disparity in the incentive amount offered 
to the non-commissioned officers’ Corps could adversely affect both the recruitment and 
retention of Special Forces warrant officers. Additionally, the Regiment should consider 
permitting Special Forces warrant officers and non-commissioned officers the 
opportunity to receive the CSRB prior to 19 years of service. 
B. INITIATE A SERB FOR OVER STRENGTH CW5 GRADE PLATE 
The quantitative data gathered from the Army’s Human Resources Command in 
May 2014 illustrates the Regiment’s Special Forces warrant officer CW5 grade plate 
population at 189 percent strength. This over-strength grade plate hampers the upward 
growth of the Regiment’s CW4 population. Stellar CW4s are leaving service due to the 
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Regiment’s inability to mandate retirements of its CW5 grade plate. The Regiment 
should initiate a Selective Early Retirement Board for CW5s who no longer remain 
relevant to the force. 
C. REDUCE PERCEIVED STIGMA OF THE NCO CORPS 
Senior leaders should actively address the perceived stigma associated with a 
Special Forces non-commissioned officer transitioning to a Special Forces warrant 
officer. This issue affects not just the non-commissioned Officer Corps, the Warrant 
Officer Corps, or the Officer Corps, but the health of the regiment as a whole. Senior 
non-commissioned officers should understand the transition of their younger soldiers into 
the Special Forces warrant officer program only strengthens the Regiment. Command 
emphasis should be placed on recruiting stellar non-commissioned officers to fill the 
Special Forces Warrant Officer Corps. The Special Forces warrant officer program needs 
to be embraced by the non-commissioned Officer Corps. Remove the stigma; one team, 
one fight!  
D. TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE IN EMPHASIZING THE 180A PROGRAM 
In order to further stimulate the recruitment and retention of the Special Forces 
warrant officer, the Regiment’s commanders should assume an active role in emphasizing 
the 180A program from the non-commissioned officers’ accessions into the Special 
Forces warrant officer program through their professional development and career 
management. Sergeant majors and command sergeant majors should also assume a 
commensurate level of ownership. Ensuring the right individuals transition, with the 
support of the non-commissioned officer corps, will further the credibility of the program 
and assist in diminishing the perceived stigma previously promulgated when a non-
commissioned officer transitions into the warrant officer cohort.  
The process of gathering the qualitative data described in this thesis drawn from 
discussions with 13 of the Regiment’s top experts consumed an estimated 247 hours. This 
thesis empirically identified the current and historical factors affecting the recruitment 
and retention of the Special Forces warrant officer. In order to reverse the decline of the 
Special Forces warrant officer population, this thesis proposes the Regiment’s leadership 
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observe and incorporate the above-mentioned principal recommendations. If not, the 
Regiment’s warrant officer population will likely further deteriorate.  
Unfortunately, this author was unable to contact all of the Regiment’s command 
chief warrant officers. In further research, this author would recommend incorporating 
the insights from the remainder of these leaders and including additional thoughts from 
commanders and command sergeant majors. Additionally, this author would recommend 
contacting recently promoted Warrant Officer-Ones in order to gain further insight into 
the younger Special Forces warrant officer cohort’s reasoning for transitioning.  
  
 40
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 41
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Brown, B. M. (1976). The Army warrant officer career: Toward manager or technician. 
Ft. Leavenworth, KA: Army Command and General Staff College.  
Crerar, J. H. (2013, November 22). Warrant Officer Historical Foundation: The Special 
Forces warrant officer, the beginnings. Retrieved from http://www.usawoa.org/ 
woheritage/Hist_SF_WO.htm  
Department of the Army. (2010). Commissioned officer professional development and 
career management. DA Pamphlet 600–3. Washington, DC: Author. 
Ferro, G., Wisecarver, M., White, S., &  McPherson, W. (April 2006). Recruitment and 
Accession of Special Forces Warrant Officer. Research Report 1851. U.S. Army 
Research Institute.  
Glaser, B., & Strauss, A. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for 
qualitative research. Chicago: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 
Huntington, S. P. (1972). The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-
military relations. London: Oxford University Press. 
Jean, G. V. (2009). U.S. Special operations command seeks culturally attuned warriors. 
National Defense Magazine. Retrieved from 
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2009/April/Pages 
/USSpecialOperationsCommandSeeksCulturallyAttunedWarriors.aspx 
Strauss, A. (1995). Notes on the native and development of general theories. Qualitative 
Inquiry, 1(1): 7–18. 
Thomas, R. (2005). 1st SFG(A)’s recommendations for the Special Forces warrant 
officers (180A) way ahead. [Memorandum] Fort Lewis, WA: Headquarters, 1st 
Special Forces Group (Airborne). 
Under Secretary of Defense (2013). Critical skills retention bonus for Army Special 
Forces warrant officers, military occupational specialty 180A. [Memorandum.] 
Washington, DC: Author. 
United States Army Special Forces Command. (2011). Management policy for SF 
warrant officers (180A) (Policy Number 01–08). FT Bragg: Author. 
United States Army Warrant Officer Recruiting. (2014). Warrant officer prerequisites and 
duty description: 180A—Special Forces warrant officer. Retrieved November 25, 
2014, from http://www.usarec.army.mil/hq/warrant/prerequ/WO180A.shtml 
 42
Warrant Officers Heritage Foundation. (2013, November 18). Warrant officer studies and 
reports. Retrieved from http://www.usawoa.org/woheritage/WO_Studies-
Reports.htm. 
 43
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
